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PROTECTING THE MENTALLY INCOMPETENT
CHILD'S TRUST INTEREST FROM STATE
REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS
JOHN P. MASSEY*

INTRODUCTION

Many mental incompetents require institutional care. A number of institutions providing such care are publicly established and supported.' Due
to the increasing expenses involved in maintaining these institutions, most
states have enacted reimbursement statutes which allow recovery of at least a
portion of the expenses from the assets of the incompetent and specified relatives. 2 Such access to individual assets has prompted the affected individuals
to seek protective devices for their property. This article focuses on parental
testamentary attempts to secure trusts established for the benefit of their
3
mentally incompetent children from public reimbursement claims.
These efforts have resulted in a direct conflict between competing policies: the policy of state reimbursement for expenses incurred in supporting
mental incompetents and the policy of unhampered testamentary disposition
as a way to provide children with some measure of security. This conflict
has not been addressed in Colorado notwithstanding the presence of the elements for conflict. Colorado has both a reimbursement statute 4 and, it is
assumed, parents who do not want their testamentary assets consumed by
the state in exchange for care that would be provided were there no available assets. Implicit in this desire to protect assets is the desire to extend
benefits to their children beyond those provided by the state. 5 By examining
the treatment of this conflict in other jurisdictions and by relying upon established trust and estate principles, a general rule may be developed which
can be integrated with Colorado law. 6
* B.S., United States Air Force Academy; J.D., University of Denver; candidate for the
New Mexico bar.
1. COLO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
2. Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 838, 841 (1963).
3. Wherever the word "child" appears alone in the text, it refers to the mentally incompetent child.
4. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-12-101 to -109 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
5. Somewhat analogous to this modern conflict between parents and the state is the parental testamentary attempt to secure property for the benefit of the incapacitated child. In
Nicholas v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1895), the Supreme Court said:
Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property in securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills of life, the
vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived.
Id at 727.
6. Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 838, 851 (1963), specifically rejects a solution based on a general
rule. Rather, it contends that the solution must be provided on a case-by-case basis, determined
by the particular circumstances involved. This note develops a general rule with application
beyond Colorado.
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REIMBURSEMENT STATUTES

The purpose of a reimbursement statute is to relieve the public of some
of the cost of caring for the mental incompetent. 7 This is accomplished in
Colorado and in other states by imposing primary cost liability on the incompetent, secondary liability on named relatives, typically the spouse and
parents, and residual liability on the state.8 This individual liability is in
derogation of the common law which casts sole responsibility for institutional care of mental incompetents on the state, regardless of the financial
condition of the patient or his family. 9 Due to this variance from common
law, courts have strictly construed reimbursement statutes in a light most
favorable to the individual whose assets are sought.' 0
While this common law concept of state responsibility is evinced in state
constitutions and statutes, constitutional challenges based upon this premise
2
have been rejected." Constitutional challenges grounded on due process'
and equal protection 13 have also been rejected. In short, barring an inept
legislative construction, reimbursement statutes have been held constitutional. 14
II.

PARENT LIABILITY

15

Prior to addressing the public's right to a child's trust interest, a discussion of Colorado parental liability is warranted for two reasons. First, if the
liability is extensive, the question of protecting assets may be mute. Second,
the basic procedure used to obtain the parent's assets is nearly identical' 6 to
that required to obtain the child's assets.
Colorado requires the Department of Institutions to make a determination of the actual cost of each patient's care and an assessment of a liable
7. In re Houghton Estate, 114 N.H. 33, 34, 314 A.2d 674, 675 (1974);cf. Schleiger v. State,
193 Colo. 531, 534, 568 P.2d 441, 443 (1977) (when insurance proceeds are available, the insurance company should pay, not the taxpayer).
8. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-12-101(1) (1973); accord, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-66 (West
Supp. 1980), construtedin Constanza v. Verona, 48 N.J. Super. 355, 137 A.2d 614 (1958); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5121.01-.10 (Page Supp. 1979), construed in Department of Mental Hygiene
& Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83 (1968).
9. Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 8-9, 441 P.2d 153, 156 (1968);
Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 149, 243 N.E.2d
83, 85 (1968); State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 45, 308 S.W.2d 4, 6 (1957). But cf. Grames v.
Norris, 3 Ill. 2d 112, 115, 120 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1954) (at common law the incompetent's estate was
liable for necessaries).
10. Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. I, 9, 441 P.2d 153, 156 (1968); In
re Houghton Estate, 114 N.H. 33, 35, 314 A.2d 674, 676 (1974).
11. Wigington v. State Home and Training School, 175 Colo. 159, 486 P.2d 417 (1971).
12. Id at 162, 486 P.2d at 419; Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 10,
441 P.2d 153, 157 (1968). But see Miller v. State Dep't of Treasury, 385 Mich. 296, 188 N.W.2d
795 (1971).
13. In re Estate of Buzzelle, 176 Colo. 554, 558, 491 P.2d 38, 40, appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
13 (1968).
14. For an overview of the constitutionality of reimbursement statutes, see Annot., 48
A.L.R. 733 (1927).
15. This section is not essential to the development of the general rule. It does provide
background, however, which is useful to the attorney faced with questions concerning public
reimbursement liability.
16. See text accompanying notes 19-20, intra.
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person's ability to pay the cost. Based upon these findings, a judicial assessment will be issued against that person. 17 The determination and assessment are conditions precedent to valid state claims.'
Parental liability is specifically limited. The Colorado statute provides
for payment of assessed charges for one hundred eighty months or until the
child reaches twenty-one, whichever first occurs. 19 Additionally, the state
will not demand full payment when exhaustion of parental assets would result. 20 The parent's liability is further limited by death. In order to subject
the parent's estate to reimbursement claims, there must have been a valid
debt established by the determination and assessment 2' made during the
parent's life. 22 This precludes charges against the decedent's estate incurred
after death. 23 Further, the state assumes a status no greater than other
claimants against a decedent's estate. Specifically, the state must file its
claim within the period provided by the non-claim statute or it will be for24
ever barred.
Because of these statutory limitations and because insurance coverage is
often available for these expenses, 25 it is likely that the average parent will
possess assets available for testamentary distribution to the child. The problem now becomes one of devising a testamentary instrument which will safeguard the assets from public reimbursement claims.
III.

TRUSTS

The most tried testamentary device, in the context of this issue, is the
testamentary trust. The reasons for selecting the trust are basic. Trusts can
shield the beneficial interest from invasion by the beneficiary's creditors.
Additionally, trusts can remove the burden of managing assets from the incompetent beneficiary. Both purposes are of fundamental concern to the
26
parent of a mentally incompetent child.
17. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-12-102 to -104 (1973).
18. Schleiger v. State, 193 Colo. 531, 533, 568 P.2d 441, 443 (1977); Estate of Randall v.
Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 6, 441 P.2d 153, 155 (1968); Ft. Logan Mental Health
Center v. Harwood, 34 Colo. App. 213, 524 P.2d 614 (1974).
19. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-12-103(2) (1973).
20. Set COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-12-104(2), (3) (1973) for factors the Department of Institutions considers in determining ability to pay.
21. See text accompanying notes 17-18, supra.
22. Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 9, 441 P.2d 153, 156 (1968);
People v. Bozaich, 29 Colo. App. 468, 487 P.2d 597 (1971).
23. Wigington v. State Home and Training School, 175 Colo. 159, 165, 486 P.2d 417, 420
(1971).
24. Sommermeyer v. Price, 603 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1979); Estate of Randall v. Colorado State
Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 441 P.2d 153 (1968); State v. Estate of Butler, 30 Colo. App. 246, 491 P.2d
102 (1971).
25. Schleiger v. State, 193 Colo. 531, 533, 568 P.2d 441, 443 (1977); Estate of Randall v.
Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. 1, 6, 441 P.2d 153, 155 (1968); Ft. Logan Mental Health
Center v. Harwood, 34 Colo. App. 213, 524 P.2d 614 (1974).
26. For other advantages of trusts, see S. ScoTT & S. SIUTA, LEGAL RIGHTS OF DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 226 (1979), where attention is given to the advantages of a trust
as compared to a guardianship. What is not explained is that a guardianship may not be terminated until all debts owed the state are satisfied. Whereas an incompetent trust beneficiary
receives legal title to trust assets upon return to competency, the state is able to collect through
the guardianship. No statute of limitations exists to block collection. See State v. Estate of
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A trust is not a guaranty of asset security, however. 27 The state has
several means by which it may pursue reimbursement. When the child has a
beneficial interest in a trust and the trustee refuses to release that interest to
the state, the state may proceed against the interest in its capacity as a custodial guardian. In this procedure, the state asserts that it is safeguarding the
child's welfare, in response to the trustee's failure to do so. Therefore, a judicial order compelling the trustee to release trust assets for the child's welfare
is proper and necessary. 28 Similarly, the state may proceed as a surety, subrogating any legal right to maintenance that the child might have arising
out of a beneficial trust interest. 29 Both of these procedures require the state
to employ the fiction of acting in the child's stead.
30
A more direct method is for the state to proceed as a support creditor.
In that capacity the state acts in its own behalf without resorting to the
fiction of acting for the child. Additionally, the state, as a governmental
entity, may be able to claim a preferential status in relation to other support
3
creditors. '

Whichever option the state pursues, the basis of its action is the reimbursement statute. The Colorado statute provides that allproperty of liable
persons shall be subject to state claims, irrespective of its origin, composition, or
source. 32 By resorting to a testamentary trust, the parent attempts to withdraw the assets from this property classification. The basic test becomes:
Does the mentally incompetent beneficiary have an interest in the trust estate which he can compel the trustee to apply for his benefit? If he has such
an interest, the state can reach that interest, 33 but only to the extent of the
beneficiary's reach. 34 The extent of the beneficiary's interest depends, in
Petzoldt, 126 Colo. 76, 246 P.2d 909 (1952); Joyce v. People, 81 Colo. 306, 255 P. 622 (1927).
The lesson is simple: Avoid guardianships or do not pass title to the child upon trust termination.
27. See Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 678, 320 P.2d
186, 188 (1958) (mentally ill person's estate includes beneficial interest in trust); Department of
Pub. Welfare v. Meek, 264 Ky. 771, 773, 95 S.W.2d 599, 600-01 (1936) (trust estates are subject
to the charges of the beneficiary).
28. See Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186
(1958).
29. See Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243
N.E.2d 83 (1968).
30. See State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 308 S.W.2d 4 (1957).
31. 60 HARV. L. REv. 312, 313 (1946). But cf. Sommermeyer v. Price, 603 P.2d 135, 137
(Colo. 1979)(the state of Colorado obtained no special creditor status when filing against a
decedent's estate).
32. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 27-12-109(2)(1973). It should be remembered that the statute
will be strictly construed in favor of the individual. This may aid in the judicial determination
that a particular trust interest is not the beneficiary's property in the context of the reimbursement statute.
33. Department of Pub. Welfare v. Meek, 264 Ky. 771, 773, 95 S.W.2d 599, 601 (1936); cf.
In re Wright's Will, 12 Wis. 2d 375, 381, 107 N.W.2d 146, 150 (1961)(the beneficiary must have
an absolute and uncontingent interest in the trust estate). See also Reilly v. State, 119 Conn.
508, 510, 177 A. 528, 530 (1935).
34. See Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243
N.E.2d 83 (1968)(subrogation action allows the surety to claim whatever right the beneficiary
has); State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 308 S.W.2d 4 (1957)(support creditor can reach the trust res
only to the extent that the beneficiary can).

1981]

MENTAL INCOMPETENT'S TRUST

35
turn, on the intent of the testator.

Parent-testators have used three basic trusts in their attempts to remove
assets from the property classification and, thus, from the state's reach: the
support trust, the spendthrift trust, and the discretionary trust. These trusts
will be treated separately, implying elements unique to each. Settlors, however, are creative and the separate trust elements are often commingled, re37
36
sulting in hybrid trusts and judicial confusion.
A.

Support Trust

A support trust restricts the beneficial interest to that necessary for education or support. 38 A clear manifestation of the settlor's intent to restrict
the trust's use solely for support is essential to its validity. A mere testamentary classification of the trust as one for support, without further evidence of
the testator's intent, may cast it into a general trust category. 39 Similarly, a
manifestation of intent which goes beyond the "support only" restriction
40
may cost the trust its support trust classification.
The support trust classification has the advantage of shielding the beneficial interest from most creditors. 4 It is this aspect which makes the support trust appealing to parents who want to preserve assets for their
children's use. The disadvantage of such a trust, however, lies in the exception to the "no creditors" rule. That exception allows support creditors to
obtain claim relief from a support trust. 4 2 Thus, a state which provides institutional care and maintenance is clearly entitled to reimbursement from the
43
trust assets as a support creditor.
35. State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 49, 308 S.W.2d 4, 10 (1957): RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 128 (1957).
36. See, e.g., Estate of Hinckley v. Blackstock, 195 Cal. App. 2d 808, 15 Cal. Rptr. 570
(1961)(support trust with discretionary power); Constanza v. Verona, 48 N.J. Super. 355, 137
A.2d 614 (1958) (spendthrift trust with discretionary power). Department of Mental Hygiene &
Correction v.Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83 (1968)("absolute and sole discretion"
within support guidelines held neither purely discretionary nor a strict support trust). Compare
City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865 (1946), and Reilly v. State, 119 Conn.
508, 177 A. 528 (1935)(separate cases construing the same trust where the first court termed the
trust discretionary and the second court termed it spendthrift) wit/h 2 S. Scor, LAw OF
TRUSTS § 154, at 1176 n.2 (3d ed. 1967)(trust in Reilly categorized as a support trust).
37. It has been stated that -[clourts do not always clearly appreciate the distinction be2 S.Scorr-, LA
tween spendthrift trusts and trusts for support and discretionary trusts .
OF TRUSTS § 154 (3d ed. 1967).
38. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 128, Comment e: 154. (1957): cf. State v.
Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 47, 308 S.W.2d 4, 8 (1957)(the words "support and maintenance" indicate
a support trust).
39. 2 S. SCOTT, supra note 37. A general trust, with no restrictions on the beneficial interest, is alienable by the beneficiary and subject to creditor claims.
40. See City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865 (1946)("comfortable trust"
distinguished from support trust).
41. 2 S. SCOTT, supra note 37; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 128, Comment c
(1957).
42. State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 49, 308 S.W.2d 4, 10 (1957). 2 S. ScoTr, supra note 37,
§ 157.2; 60 HARV. L. REV. 312, 313 (1946).
43. See State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 308 S.W.2d 4 (1957); 60 HARv. L. REV. 312 (1946).
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Spendthrft Trust 44

Parents have also resorted to the spendthrift trust, a device similar to
the support trust. One similarity is that, like a support trust, the spendthrift
trust is designed to provide assets for support and maintenance of the beneficiary, secure from creditor claims. 4 5 A spendthrift trust is distinguished from
a support trust in that the former protects the assets from creditor claims
through specific provisions which preclude alienation of a present interest,
while the latter creates a future contingent interest, from which neither ben46
eficiary nor creditors can demand payment.
As with a support trust, the fatal flaw of a spendthrift trust is that support creditors can obtain satisfaction from the trust fund. 47 The logic in
allowing support creditors this access is that the testator's primary intent of
providing support and maintenance is not subverted. 48 State support creditors may take additional comfort in the public policy sustaining spendthrift
trusts; that is, spendthrift trusts provide a method for preventing "impecunious beneficiaries" from becoming "public charges."'49 If the state is not allowed to recover the public expenses of supporting a mental incompetent,
the incompetent becomes, by definition, a "public charge."
C.

Dzscretz'ona.y Trust

A discretionary trust provides the beneficiary with only so much of the
trust assets as the trustee, in his discretion, decides to release. 50 The extent of
the beneficiary's interest is, therefore, dependent on the trustee's discretion.
This indefinite nature of the beneficiary's interest is the key to frustrating
creditor claims.51 Basically, a beneficiary cannot compel the trustee to exercise his discretion. Since the creditor has no greater right in the beneficiary's
interest than the beneficiary has, the creditor cannot compel the trustee to
52
release trust funds for the creditor's claims.
There is an important qualification to the trustee's discretionary power.
Since the power is granted or created by the testator, he may limit it in any
manner, and the trustee must act in accordance with the limited power. If
44. Spendthrift trusts have not been granted universal approval, because they interfere
with the policy of free alienation of property. See GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (2d ed.
1947), for state decisions on the validity of spendthrift trusts. They are valid in Colorado. E.g.,
Snyder v. O'Connor, 102 Colo. 567, 81 P.2d 773 (1938). See alo In re Delano's Estate, 62 Cal.
App. 2d 808, 145 P.2d 672 (1944); City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865
(1946); Constanza v. Verona, 48 N.J. Super. 355, 137 A.2d 614 (1958).
45. E.g., In re Delano's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 2d 808, 145 P.2d 672 (1944); Newell v. Tubbs,
103 Colo. 224, 84 P.2d 820 (1938); Reilly v. State, 119 Conn. 508, 177 A. 528 (1935); 2 S.
ScoTT, supra note 37; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152(2), 154 (1957).
46. 2 S. ScorT, supra note 37, § 157.2.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1957). Stealso Lackmann v. Department
of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186 (1958); State v. Parrot, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct.
400 (1967). But see Reilly v. State, 119 Conn. 508, 177 A. 528 (1935).
48. 2 S.ScoTT, supra note 37, § 157.2.
49. In re Delano's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 2d 808, 814, 145 P.2d 672, 675 (1944).
50. 2 S.ScoTT, supra note 37, § 128.3; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 (1957).
51. 60 HARV. L. REV. 312 (1946).
52. State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 49, 308 S.W.2d 4, 10 (1957); see text accompanying note

33, supra.
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the trustee acts beyond the testator's limitations, he has abused his discretion
53
and a court can compel him to act correctly.
It is common for testators to limit the discretionary power. Also, courts
may find that the testator intended limited discretionary power, even in
cases where words such as "absolute" or "sole" are used to describe the
power. 54 Court-inferred limits on intent will be given effect. Should an intent to provide for the beneficiary's care, support, maintenance, benefit, or
words to that effect, be discovered, the discretionary power becomes subject
to that testamentary intent, and the beneficiary, through the court, can compel the trustee to act accordingly.5 5 This implies an interest which, because
of the beneficiary's right to compel support, will allow a support creditor to
compel release of the trust interest to satisfy support claims. As with support
and spendthrift trusts, release of discretionary trust assets to support creditors does not undermine the testator's intent if that intent manifests a support purpose. On the contrary, the release of the assets under such
circumstances implements the testator's intentions.
IV.

GENERAL RULE

Support trusts, spendthrift trusts, and discretionary trusts are designed
to protect the beneficiary. When ordinary creditor claims are involved these
trusts will provide successful protections. When support creditor claims are
involved, however, such as a state's claim for reimbursement of expenses for
institutional support of a mental incompetent, the trust devices will not always insure successful creditor barriers.
Obviously, support and spendthrift trusts are inappropriate devices for
parents who wish to bar state reimbursement claims. Those trusts provide
an automatic entree for the state acting in its capacity as a guardian, surety,
or support creditor. The discretionary trust does not have this automatic
feature, however. It is only when the trustee's discretionary power is drafted
to include provisions for the support or care of the beneficiary that the state
can compel reimbursement from the trust res. A discretionary trust, however, need not include such provisions.
The parent who wants to establish a testamentary trust for a mentally
incompetent child, secure from public reimbursement claims for institu53. Estate of Hinckley v. Blackstock, 195 Cal. App. 2d 808, 813, 15 Cal. Rptr. 570, 575
(1961); Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 680, 320 P.2d 186,
190 (1958); In re Will of Cooper, 76 Misc. 2d 166, 169, 349 N.Y.S.2d 613, 616 (Sur. Ct. 1973); In
re Crow's Will, 56 Misc. 2d 398, 398, 288 N.Y.S.2d 965, 965 (Sur. Ct. 1968). State v. Rubion,
158 Tex. 43, 48, 308 S.W.2d 4, 9 (1957).
54. Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186
(1958); In re Will of Cooper, 76 Misc. 2d 166, 349 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sur. Ct. 1973); In re Crow's
Will, 56 Misc. 2d 398, 288 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sur. Ct. 1968); Department of Mental Hygiene &
Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83 (1968).
55. Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186
(1958); Department of Pub. Welfare v. Meek, 264 Ky. 771, 95 S.W.2d 599 (1936); In re Gruber's
Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sur. Ct. 1953). It is probable, then, that even a discretionary spray
without specified shares for the class members would not prevent support creditors from reaching the trust if intent to support is contained in the instrument. See generally 2 S. Sco-r-r, supra
note 37, §§ 155(1), Comment d; 161, Comment b.
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tional care, may do so by drafting a discretionary trust carefully limited to
exclude any provisionsfor support, care, or maintenance. The parent-testator should
make clear his intent to h'mit applicationof the trust assets to supplementing benefits
providedat public expense. Such a trust clearly withdraws whatever interest the
child may possess from the property classification essential to a public reimbursement claim. This trust construction rule is in accord with accepted
testamentary and trust provisions applied in cases dealing with reimburse56
ment statutes.
V.

THE FINAL OBSTACLE:

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

This general rule is subject to rejection by the legislature or by the judiciary. Rejection would, however, establish the primacy of the policy of reimbursing public expenses over the policy of free testamentary disposition
whenever the policies conflict. Justification for rejecting this general rule
would have to be sufficient to override two strong considerations: the historical evaluation of the competing policies and the sociological evolution of
public support conceptions.
The first consideration, the historical evaluation of the competing policies, has been addressed by the courts. The judiciary has mandated strict
construction of reimbursement statutes whenever there is a conflict with testamentary dispositions. 57 This posture has been adopted for two reasons.
First, the concept of devising property freely has been considered a basic
constitutional right. 58 Second, the burden of providing care for the mental
incompetent originally fell on the public. 59 These reasons suggest that testamentary dispositions should be given deferential treatment, whenever possible, in those situations involving a conflict with reimbursement statutes.
The second consideration, the sociological evolution of public support
conceptions, evinces a trend which would have to be ignored by any legislature or court which rejects the proffered general rule. That trend is the conceptual evolution of welfare from a charitable status to a status of right and
entitlement deserving of constitutional protection. 6°
When viewed as a gift, the stigma of charity traditionally attached to
public assistance has prompted courts to deny that a testator could have
intended that the object of his bounty become a public charge in order to
56. An overview of cases where the trusts withstood state reimbursement claims and cases
where the trusts failed this purpose will make the general rule apparent. Compare Estate of
Hinckley v. Blackstock, 195 Cal. App. 2d 808, 15 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1961)(state claims denied);
City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865 (1946)(reimbursement claims denied);
and In re Wright's Will, 12 Wis. 2d 375, 107 N.W.2d 146 (1961) (state claims denied) with
Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186 (1958) (state
claims allowed); In re Gruber's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sur. Ct. 1968)(state claims allowed); and
Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83
(1968) (state claims allowed).
57. Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hosp., 166 Colo. I, 9, 441 P.2d 153, 156 (1968); In
re Houghton Estate, 114 N.H. 33, 35, 314 A.2d 674, 676 (1974).
58. E.g., State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 308 S.W.2d 4 (1957); In re Wright's Will, 12 Wis. 2d
375, 107 N.W.2d 146 (1961).
59. See text accompanying note 9, supra.
60. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (some welfare benefits are a right for which
one must be accorded due process before the benefits can be terminated).
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preserve trust assets. 6 ' Courts have so held in instances where no specific
reference to public support considerations could be found in the will. Courts
have even used this rationale in instances where the trust instrument directed the trustee to consider other available resources in dispensing trust
benefits. 6 2 In short, when viewed as charity, courts will not consider public
assistance as an available resource when reviewing a trustee's use of discretion.
This public conception of welfare as charity has changed with the expansion of welfare benefits. The advent of medicare, social security, and the
like, has extended public assistance to a growing number of citizens. With
this expansion, the functional view of welfare has evolved from a charitable
one to one embracing a public insurance program with vested rights for citizens. 63 Just as it would be unfair to deny with impunity these vested rights
in all but the most destitute situations, so would it be unfair to deny a
mental incompetent public assistance because he possesses a limited benefi64
cial interest in a trust fund.
SUMMARY

Public confiscation of trust funds set aside for the benefit of a publicly
institutionalized mentally incompetent child can be prevented by careful
drafting of a testamentary trust. This conclusion has been clearly expressed
in case law:
This case presents a striking example of what happens so frequently in instances where testators seek to provide a trust for the
benefit of some unfortunate relative or friend. Welfare officials are,
generally, very active in taking advantage of these situations. Although these situations are of very common occurrence, I never
have observed one where the simple precaution of drafting was adequately taken to insure the little patrimony provided against the
onslaughts of welfare officials. Without protective language accompanying it, discretion given to the fiduciary is not enough ...
In every such case, it would be an easy matter to prevent any such
controversy by the simple means of more explicit draftsmanship,
plus selection of a fiduciary who could be depended upon to take a
65
friendly and efficient interest in the intended beneficiary.
The explicit language to which the court refers should be sufficient to
take the trust out of the ambit of support or spendthrift trusts and to place it
clearly within the province of a discretionary trust. Further, the testator
61. In re Will of Cooper, 76 Misc. 2d 166, 349 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sur. Ct. 1973); In re Crow's
Will, 56 Misc. 2d 398, 288 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sur. Ct. 1968).
62. Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186
(1958); In re Gruber's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sur. Ct. 1953); see Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83 (1968). But see Reilly v. State,
119 Conn. 508, 177 A. 528 (1935); In re Wright's Will, 12 Wis. 2d 375, 107 N.W.2d 146 (1961).
63. Estate of Escher, 94 Misc. 2d 952, 407 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. 1978), reviews this evolutionary change in the perception of public assistance from a gift to a right.
64. Town of Randolph v. Roberts, 346 Mass. 578, 195 N.E.2d 72 (1964).
65. In re Emmon's Will, 59 N.Y.S.2d 264, 269 (Sur. Ct. 1946)(Page, Sur.)(citations omitted).
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should make clear his intent to limit the trustee's discretionary actions to the
application of trust assets for benefits which supplement any public assist66
ance received by the incompetent beneficiary.
Application of this rule will not defeat the purpose of a reimbursement
statute. It will only exclude the statute's application in those specific instances where a parent employs the rule to secure benefits for a mentally
incompetent child. This will result in a proper balancing of the competing
policies of public reimbursement and free testamentary disposition. The rule
represents a compromise which allows both policies to coexist in a fair and
equitable manner.

66. See In re Wright's Will, 12 Wis. 2d 375, 107 N.W.2d 146 (1961), for an example of
explicit "supplement only" language which proved successful. See also S. ScoTr & S. SiuTA,
LEGAL RIGHTS OF DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 227 (1979), for suggested wording
that "[t]he trust is intended to supplement the disabled person's earnings or governmental
financial assistance." Id. (emphasis added).

